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PETER BOHM*

CVM Spells Responses to
Hypothetical Questions
ABSTRACT
Partof this note takes a new look at an earlierstudy of mine (1972),
sometimes used-incorrectly-insupport of CVM; it is shown that
while Cummings and Harrison are right in criticizing this study
for not providing such support, they do so for the wrong reasons.
Moreover, it is argued here (a) that even if it could be shown that
CVM provides acceptableaccuracy in trial runs, this property cannot be counted on when CVM is used for actual decisionmaking;
(b) that the need for CVM has been exaggerated, since CVM is
neither the only approach to estimatingnon-use values, nor obviously better than using methods that estimate only use-values.
In 1966, a Swedish evening newspaper-Kvallspostenin Malm6conducted an interesting study using the Contingent Valuation Method
(CVM). A sample of the population was asked whether they would
want the Swedish government to raise its aid to LDCs from 0.25 percent to one percent of GNP. Forty percent said "yes". Immediately afterwards, those who had said yes were asked a second CVM question:
"Would you accept this increase in government aid even if taxes would
have to be raised" (meaning roughly: ",... if it would cost you anything")? Half of those saying "yes" to the first question now said "no".
Somewhat later in 1966, a group of assistant professors at the
Economics Department of the University of Stockholm arranged a petition among university employees in Stockholm, urging the Swedish
government to increase its aid to LDCs to one percent of GNP. To avoid
having the petition flatly dismissed as irrelevant, it was decided that
all those who signed the petition would also make a commitment to
pay one percent of their after-tax income during one year to unspecified multilateral UNDP assistance to LDC. Sixty-four percent of all university employees signed -and had withdrawals made from their
paychecks during the following year. The Swedish prime minister who
received the petition said he was impressed by-what may here be
called-the non-CVM nature of the petition.1
* Department of Economics, University of Stockholm. I am indebted to Bill Desvousges,
Glenn Harrison, Reed Johnson, Brengt Kristrom and Hans Lind for helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. It may be added that, some years later, Swedish government aid was in fact raised
to one percent of GNP. The role of the petition for this outcome can only be speculated
about; most likely it was not large, but probably still much larger than any study based
on hypothetical questions.
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The first story illustrates the fact-hardly surprising to most
of us-that responses to hypothetical questions cannot be trusted to
reveal the truth; more specifically, it shows how significant even part
of the strategic bias of hypothetical questions can be (here, the part
which is revealed when moving from the first to the second-still hypothetical-question). The second story is told because it indicates that
the "best available procedure" for public-good (or public-bad) demand
revelation need not be CVM, as the Ohio court suggested (see Cummings and Harrison, p. 1). In particular instances, methods involving
real payment may be much more convincing (although much more costly,
to be sure) for decisionmakers-governments or judges-whose decisions are open to influence. My comments here will refer essentially
to these two points. More specifically, I wish to address the questions:
(a) are there ways to settle the dispute about the size of strategic bias
in CVM when used for actual decisionmaking, and is that size robust
enough and hence capable of being systematically taken into account;
and (b) are there competitors to CVM in the role of "best available"
procedures for valuing public goods or bads, at least for certain issues?
In dealing with these questions, I will elaborate on the results of two
studies of mine which were discussed at some length in Cummings
and Harrison (CH) 2 and which have a further bearing on these issues.
The reader is advised to observe that the comments here are
given by a non-United States economist, who has little acquaintance
with the United States legal system.
On the relevance of hypothetical questions for decisionmaking
To begin with, it is worthwhile noting that there are important
policy questions that can hardly be other than hypothetical. Where the
line must be drawn will probably change over time depending on the
advances of social science. Thus, for example, few economists would
now say categorically that questions about "willingness to pay" (WTP)
for all public goods must be hypothetical, which generally seems to
have been the belief before the era of Clarke-Groves mechanisms and
other recent advances in this field. On the other hand, few would argue
that anything close to all public goods or bads could be subjected to
practicable demand-revealing mechanisms.
In any event, one must ask: what information can we expect to
obtain from responses to hypothetical questions such as those used in
CVM? As shown by CH, the literature in favor of CVM has not produced any proof that any particular design of this method is known
to reveal WTP, or can reveal WTP by any known degree of approxi2. R. Cummings & G. Harrison, Was the Ohio Court Well Informed in their Assessment
of the Accuracy of the Contingent Valuation Method?, 34 Nat. Res. J. Vol. 1.
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mation, when CVM is applied to a new issue. Thus, although we know
a lot more about CVM now than we did some ten years ago, we have
not been able to identify a design that would remove the original doubts
about CVM, especially with respect to "strategic bias" and "lack of sincerity". If CVM is deemed an acceptable procedure to calculate natural
resource damages in CERCLA litigations, i.e., if responses to hypothetical
questions are deemed to provide an adequate basis for decisions which
have an impact on CV respondents, it is the extent of strategic bias that
is our primary concern.
Why has it not been possible to determine whether or not any
particular CVM design is capable of repeatedly revealing actual WTP
with a reasonable level of accuracy, and specifically, without any significant strategic bias? As CH show, proponents of CVM have certainly
made some efforts in that direction. In that context, the results of an
experimental study of mine 3 have been referred to extensively in support of the use of CVM. The justification for this interpretation of my
results was refuted by CH, and I am the first to agree with that conclusion. In fact, as I shall argue here, the results of my 1972 paper support the view that responses to hypothetical questions give upward-biased
estimates of WTP. By taking a new look at this paper, we can also see
a specific example of an experimental design which can be used to answer the question posed above.
Taking a second look at Bohm (1972)
Aside from trying to substantiate the claims just made, I will
offer some critical comments on CH's interpretation of my 1972 paper.
In addition, I will highlight a few characteristics of this study that are
important to keep in mind when evaluating its results. Given CH's rather
detailed presentation of my paper, I will try to be brief.
(1) The purpose of the 1972 paper was to analyze the effects of
different incentives on non-hypotheticalWTP statements. The major part
of the experiment was aimed at comparing five approaches (denoted I
through V, see CH for details) for estimating average WTP for a specific public good. Each approach had different payment consequences,
at least one with incentives to overstate WTP, at least one with incentives to understate WTP, and one or two with mixed incentives. The
public good was showing a well-acclaimed stage-show by two famous
comedians on closed-circuit TV; the program had not yet been shown
on regular TV and would not be for another two months. Thus, it seems
fair to say that the public good in question was for most people neither of an unknown quality (or genre), nor of trivial value or interest.
3. P. Bohm, Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment, European Econ. Rev.,
3, 111-130, June 1972.
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Participants were told that stated aggregate WTP would determine whether or not the good would be produced. If it were produced, participants would have to pay according to the rules presented
to them. The purpose of the test was explained as one of finding out
in more detail, and in a new fashion, about viewers' valuation of TV
programs. The study was held on the premises of the TV company.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that various attempts were
made to perform the test in a referendum-like manner, in particular
with respect to the existing misrepresentation incentives. These incentives were brought to the attention of the participants who were explicitly asked not to give in to the incentives, since this would reduce
the value of the study for the TV company. This latter design is in line
with the "training" that people in democracies such as Sweden receive,
e.g., encouraging them to withstand "petty egoistic" incentives not to
participate in general elections (saving time versus having only an insignificant effect on the outcome). Further, it seems unlikely that government decisionmakers would allow important decisions on
compensation, conservation, clean-up operations, et cetera, i.e., decisions otherwise made by the politicians themselves, to be determined
by voting mechanisms where misrepresentation incentives are present,
without openly discussing the existence of these incentives and verbally dealing with their possible implications in an attempt to neutralize them or at least reduce their impact.
(2) The study demonstrated that there were no significant differences the five approaches. In other words, the dominance of certain
misrepresentation incentives, especially free-riding incentives, so generally accepted as a fact in the literature at the time, did not show up
in the results when the approaches were used in the "referendum-like"
manner. Thus, among these different approaches, a strategic bias did
not manifest itself.
(3) Since the direction of the incentives differed among two to
four of these approaches, with No. I providing clear incentives to underreport WTP and No. V clear incentives to over-report WTP, the (approximately) similar responses to all of them can hardly be interpreted
else than a rough unbiased estimate of the true
as reporting anything
4
average WTP.
(4) Although the purpose of the experiment was not to test responses to hypothetical WTP questions, a fairly large group of subjects
was asked to report their hypothetical WTP for the good (question Vl:l).
The average WTP for this group appeared to be higher than those for
4. For reasons that remain unclear to me, CH do not seem to want to accept this
interpretation. Rejecting it is crucial, as we shall see, for CH's argument that the study
does not say whether CVM overstates, understates, or equals true WP in this particular
application.
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the five non-hypothetical groups; however, the difference was found
to be statistically significant at the 95 percent level with respect to only
approach No. I1.It is this lack of statistically significant differences for
the four other pairs of non-hypothetical/hypothetical approaches that
seems to account for the interpretation, so common in the literature,
that the CVM approach in this study did not differ from the non-hypothetical approaches.
In the 1972 study, parametric tests were used. As shown in CH's
paper, Glenn Harrison recently subjected the raw data of this experiment to a non-parametric test. The results obtained are essentially the
same as those reported in the 1972 paper. However, in the Harrison
study, approaches I and III were significantly lower than VI: I at the 98
percent level; and approach IV was close to significantly different from
VI:I at the 95 percent level. The results of these new computations are
presented in Table 1, rows I to 6.
Given the current interest in the relation between the hypothetical
and non-hypothetical (or real-payment) approaches, and given the fact
that none of the non-hypothetical approaches revealed any misrepresentation of preferences (see point (2) above), it is interesting to compare the responses of all the non-hypotheticalgroups (I-V, which contained
23, 29, 29, 37, and 39 subjects, respectively) with those of the hypothetical approach (VI:I, 54 subjects). As can be seen from the bottom line of
Table 1,the CVM approach (VI:I) gave higher WTP responses than the
non-hypothetical ones, at the 95 percent significance level. (The average WTP of group VI:I was 25 percent larger than that for groups I-V.)
VI:I
V
IV
III
II
Group I
I
.36
II
.56.33
Il
.65
.58
.44
IV
.68
.87
.99
.60
V
.13
.058
.011
.24
.018
VI:l
.036
I-V pooled
Table 1. Probability values for testing the null hypothesis that pairs of approaches
originate in the same distribution; a Kolmogoroff-Smirnov test of the Bohm (1972)
experiments.(Source: GlenN Harrison)

This result strengthens the conclusion I originally made in passing and with at the time-a sense of stating the obvious, i.e., that responses to hypothetical questions tend to give unreliable estimates of
WTP.5 Now, with the addition of the comparison between CVM (VI:I)
and the pool of the non-hypothetical groups (I-V), the only conclusion
5. In response to CH's concluding query about the reason for this "strong conclusion":
it was the difference between VI:I and III (the only significant difference in the material)
that led me to conclude in the 1972 paper that my results were compatible with the view
that ",... that people respond in an 'irresponsible fashion' ... to hypothetical questions."

See supra note 4.
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that seems possible to extract from the 1972 experiment is that the CVM
approach in this particular setting tends to produce upward-biased estimates of true WTP.
However, CH seem to interpret the results in quite another way.
They conclude that ".... depending on which pair of experiments one
focuses on, we have shown that one can argue from these results that
the CVM understates, overstates, or equals true WTP". The eye-catching part of this statement is, of course, that CVM can be said to understate true WTP in this particular study. Specifically, they argue that
VI:2, the multi-unit auction that followed VI:I, understates true WTP
and then so does CVM (VI:I), since the results from VI:I and VI:2 are
virtually identical.
However, CH's interpretation of VI:2 as providing an underestimate of WTP for the commodity in question is hardly correct.
First, it should be noted that the auction approach of VI:2 is
quite different from the other approaches, which either try to elicit nonhypothetical WTP responses under "referendum-like" conditions (IV), or ask a simple hypothetical question (VI:A) concerning a public
good. Furthermore, when subjected to the VI:I question, respondents
may get the impression from the setting they are in that there is a chance
the program will in fact be shown to them. Therefore, they may be exposed to a strategic-bias incentive to "encourage" the company to produce the good, or praise them in advance for doing so, by overeporting
their WTP. By contrast, VI:2 effectively stated to the same respondents:
"We are going to show the program, but only to the 10 percent highest bidders!" This may have encouraged competition among the participants by emphatically stating that 90 percent of them would eventually
have to leave the room, while the highest bidders would remain there
and look forward to seeing the show.
The manner in which people might respond in this new situation is dramatized here for the sake of the present argument. However,
in my original paper, I tried to avoid a "sociological" discussion of behavior in this competitive situation, except to suggest briefly the obvious-that the behavior is likely to be the same as when people attend
an auction where the winners can be identified by all those participating. In Sweden, auctions of this kind are often a significant social
event, where some participants-to continue the dramatization one step
further-might "show off", e.g., by trying to indicate that money is no
problem for them, or generally behaving in ways which would attract
attention. This means that some people place bids in amounts they would
not pay for the same objects when offered on a regular market. In my
1972 paper, I simply referred to this as "auction fever".
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However, unlike what CH suggests in note 50, such behavior
is not necessarily irrational. Instead, it may demonstrate that, when
confronted by approach VI:2, people bid on something more than what
was involved in approaches I-V or VI:I. That is, in VI:2, the commodity auctioned off is a composite: the good itself plus the social implications of being known to be among the few who will consume the
good. As in similar auctions, some bidders seem to attach a value to
the latter dimension of this composite commodity. While I certainly
agree with CH that the WTP estimates provided by VI:2 may well have
been downward-biased, I suggest that what is biased here is the estimate of WTP for the composite commodity, not the good itself, which is
what approaches I-VI:I refer to.
Thus, it hardly seems meaningful to compare estimates obtained by VI:2 for one commodity with estimates obtained by other approaches with respect to another commodity. Specifically, VI:2 cannot be
used for an unequivocal interpretation of my results as (also) saying
that Vl:I, by being virtually identical to VI:2, would understate WTP
for the commodity in question.
It should be noted that CH do not seem to want to pay attention to points (1)-(3) stated above, which were the main points of my
1972 paper. These points summarized my finding that the five different non-hypothetical approaches did not yield diverging WTP estimates, which refuted the conventional wisdom at the time. Therefore,
the relevant result from my 1972 paper to be highlighted here is: For
the particular case of public goods analyzed in this paper, all the nonhypothetical approaches generated good approximations of true WTP,
in contrast to CVM, which significantly overstated true WTP.
What proof is needed for using CVM in actual decisionmaking?
The burden of proof is clearly placed on those who argue that
CVM can be used for WTP revelation. Given results such as those reported here as well as by Bennett 6 and CH, there should be no doubt
that the required proof is simply absent. However, even if the requisite proof existed, i.e., a series of independent experimentalstudies showing that CVM in each particular context consistently revealed WTP or
some stable percentage of WTP, such results could hardly validate the
use of CVM for decisionmaking, e.g., by United States courts in CERCLA litigations. New applications of CVM, the results of which now
would be used by courts, thereby possibly affecting the well-being of
the CVM respondents to a significant extent, would strengthen the misrepresentation incentives. Then, we would need to know the effects of
this new level (and possibly kind) of misrepresentation incentives.
6. J. Bennett, Strategic Behaviour: Some Experimental Evidence, 32 J. Pub. Econ. 355
(1987).
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I have here taken for granted that if CVM is to be used for decisionmaking, this will be made known to the respondents before the
questions are posed. If, instead, the purpose of the investigation were
successfully kept secret from the respondents, we would have a second, potentially equally serious, "lack-of-sincerity" problem. But then,
how would one know for certain whether such efforts were successful? Uncertainty on this point would tend to reduce the usefulness of
the exercise, since the two incentive problems have different effects on
the respondents. Aside from the fact that a democratic society might
want to avoid manipulation of its citizens by hiding the purpose of
questions which they are subjected to, making it cleAr that the responses
are to be used for decisionmaking would, in most cases, also make it
known in what direction the responses can be biased.
Another implication of accepting the face value of responses
to hypothetical questions is that signals would be given to various parties involved in the case at hand, be they firms, organizations, news
media or individuals, to urge respondents to use their now, practically
speaking, unlimited voting power. Thus, even if it had been repeatedly shown that a certain CVM design so far has given estimates with
some small maximum degree of approximation, the next application
of this approach to a new situation may not. In other words, a significant strategic bias may well appear, when CVM is used for actual decision-making, if not earlier. And now, of course, there is no
non-hypothetical approach with which CVM could be compared. If there
were, the non-hypothetical approach would have been the best available method.
Therefore, while I agree with CH's final conclusion that "a good
number of ... studies show that CVM values can overstate real economic commitments, and that these overstatements can be quite large"
and that the "courts must assess the demonstrated potential for such
overestimates in their deliberations concerning the legal necessity of
results from CVM surveys in CERCLA litigations", it seems necessary
to add that this assessment must concern the new situations where it
may have been made clear to CVM respondents that their responses
might actually influence, or even determine, compensation or other
real consequences for themselves.
One way for a method to be helpful in revealing actual WTP
would be to incorporate in its design a gauge of the extent of misrepresentation that might occur. (If not, it would be entirely up to the judges
to determine what they think is the likely extent of misrepresentation.)
It was with that aim in mind that I suggested the "interval method"
and had it tested in practice (as mentioned by CH). 7 This method al7. P. Bohm, Estimating Demand for an Actual Public Good, 24 J. Pub. Econ. 135 (1984);

see also Bennett, supra note 7.
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lows one to estimate an upper and a lower bound to aggregate WTP,
the interval between which would grow with the impact of misrepresentation incentives. The usefulness of this method would be, practically speaking, similar to that of a perfect revelation mechanism if the
impact of these incentives were small. In the non-hypothetical test,
which determined whether or not a Swedish government agency should
produce an actual (excludable) public good, half of the population of
consumers (here: local governments) was asked to report their WTP in
a setting which confronted the respondents with incentives to over-report but no incentives to under-report, while the other half was asked
the same question with the opposite incentive structure.
If the resulting interval of average WTP exceeded the production costs per consumer, the good would be produced and the respondents had to pay according to the rules presented to them. (This is what
actually happened.) As already reported in CH, the interval between
the upper and the lower bound to WTP turned out to be quite small.
It was small enough to determine the discrete output decision in this
particular case with an accuracy close to that where an approach had
existed that would reveal true WTP. The point to be emphasized here
is that this approach-given that the only incentives at work are those
referred to above-reveals the extent of WTP misrepresentation to the
political decisionmakers and that the extent was small when used in
this non-hypothetical application.
Why is this test of the interval method, which uses only nonhypothetical approaches and thus in no way deals with the CVM, relevant here? I turn to that question in the final section.
CVM-still the best available procedure?
Even though CVM does not meet reasonable quality standards
in the sense of a known minimum degree of precision, is it nonetheless
the "best method available"? At least for certain cases, there may be
better alternatives. For example, the value of environmental damage
inflicted on one particular group in a certain area may be approximated
by the WTP to avoid or eliminate similar damages as expressed by another group in another area, where in fact a demand-revealing process
had been used (say, by using the interval method, or the "minimum
real WTP" approach mentioned in the second paragraph of the introduction, or, if practicable, some truly incentive-compatible approach).
Then, this latter kind of information can hardly in general be considered to be inferior to the information that a CVM study of those already harmed and now to be compensated would provide.
Obviously, it is unlikely that there are a great many litigation
cases where the damage is sufficiently similar to the potential damage,
or damage avoidance, of an action that can be subjected to such a test.
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Nonetheless, there are some such actions and there are methods, such
as the interval method, which could be used, provided that the potentially harmed people were given the power to veto such actions by
making a sufficient economic commitment. This provision is certainly
a considerable one, but can it be excluded out of hand? More important, perhaps, is the general point that all indirect ways through which
real economic commitments for avoiding (the effects of) environmental damages do not seem to have been sufficiently investigated, for it
to be possible to state that the CVM is generally the "best available"
approach to estimating statutory use values, i.e., total values. For example, it may well be that using travel cost and hedonic methods
alone-likely to yield estimates of use values only-is a better approach for certain kinds of issues than using CVM as an instrument
for estimating total values.
This criticism does not imply that CVM is "useless". First, CVM
is clearly a practical instrument for inexpensive "early-warning" investigations of almost any issue. If responses to hypothetical questions
reveal "surprisingly strong" reactions, the CVM would serve as an important signal for politicians' "introspection" and for indicating that
more needs to be done in terms of empirical investigations or searching for indirect evidence from other sources. Second, the government
can use responses to hypothetical questions put to a collective of pollutees as the basis for claims when suing a polluter on behalf of this
collective, just as claims by a party of one, who sues another for harm
inflicted on the plaintiff, are based valuations by the plaintiff. In both
cases, it is up to the court to evaluate the bias in the estimates of the
harm inflicted by those who stand to gain from having the claims accepted.
Scientific analyses of the properties of different CVM designs
in practical applications should, of course, continue. But what has come
as a surprise to many bystanding economists for quite some time now
is not only the considerable extent to which CVM in fact has been relied upon as a provider of information, especially in the United States,
but also the doubtful arguments with which many CVM proponents
have defended their method. This now seems to have polarized the
CVM debate in an unfortunate way, as can be seen from some of the
more questionable anti-CVM arguments advanced in the Exxon Conference volume from April 1992. 8 What quite often seems to be lacking on both sides is a truly scientific-and hence at least
cautious-attitude toward the available evidence.
8. Cambridge Economics, Inc., Contingent Valuation:A CriticalAssessment, (conference
held in Washington, D.C. April 2-3, 1992).
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In particular, it seems to me that CVM protagonists often have
failed to pay sufficient attention to the fact that we are, after all, talking about hypothetical questions here. Terminology could be part of
the problem. Contingent valuation and the acronym CVM represent an
embellishment for hypothetical valuations, and this choice of terminology may have clouded some minds. Since this terminology will
hardly cloud the minds of the defense in CERCLA litigations, one may
wonder how long courts would be able to brush aside arguments by
the defense that CVM "only provides responses to hypothetical questions". In fact, accepting hypothetical questions as the "best available"
method for reliably calculating the values of intangibles may in the end
jeopardize the courts' attention to such values.
CONCLUSION
I agree with CH's view that the economics literature has not
provided any conclusive evidence that responses to hypothetical questions reveal WTP with a known degree of approximation or without
serious bias. Indeed, there is much evidence to the contrary, including
the results of my 1972 study, despite its having been referred to in support of using hypothetical questions as a sufficiently precise instrument
for estimating WTP. It has been emphasized here that once responses
to hypothetical questions are accepted for clearcut decision-making,
the strategic bias is significantly strengthened and the implications of
this effect are unknown.
It is doubtful whether, strictly speaking, the use of hypothetical questions can be seen as a scientific method, let alone the "best available procedure for reliably calculating statutory use values" as suggested
by the Ohio court. Potential indirect methods for estimating such values, reflecting non-hypothetical economic commitments, cannot be said
to be nonexisting. Although perhaps much more costly to use, such
methods are likely to be much more precise whenever they are applicable.
However, the capacity or role of these methods as "better available procedures" needs to be further evaluated. An important part of this work
requires convincing local governments that experimentation with realpayment approaches is needed, or using such methods for decisionmaking on environmental or conservation issues in the voluntary sector.
With respect to valuation issues highlighted by the Exxon Valdez accident or similar catastrophes, such non-hypothetical field experiments
may refer to projects such as the construction of protection devices against
oil spills in parts of an archipelago, using additional land for bird sanctuaries, or conserving coastal lands that government has declined to
protect.9
9. Postscript 2.
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Postscript I
The above text was written prior to the publication of the NOAA panel
report in January 1993.10 Most of what I have had to say here seems to
agree with what is argued in this report (in particular, that CVM tends
to give upward-biased WTP estimates, but that this is no reason to consider the method useless). However, there are two points on which I
disagree with the conclusions of the NOAA panel report.
First, its recommendation to use "reliably conservative" versions of CVM "as a partial or total offset to the likely tendency to exaggerate willingness to pay" NOAA panel report (p. 4610) is something
that is easy to say but hard to operationalize and accomplish. If it were
known how this could be achieved, all CV analysts would probably
have liked to do it all along. But since real-world "conservative" CVM
versions can hardly be trusted to be "reliably conservative" (e.g., in
that they may now yield an underestimate of WTP), such versions tend
to be even less useful since we would then not even know "for certain" the sign of the bias.
Second, like many others, the NOAA panelists are attracted by
the referendum (or dichotomous-choice) approach-where people are
asked whether or not they accept to pay a contribution of a given
amount-since this approach lacks an obvious strategic bias. All right,
but this approach opens up a Pandora's box of other problems related
to-what may be called-a worsening of the hypothetical status of the
questions. For example, subjects may respond differently if they know
or do not know whether or not others would have to pay the amount
in question; moreover, they might be confused by knowing (or protest
if learning later that they did not know) that others are asked about
other amounts, very much unlike a referendum. These problems of interpretation by respondents and/or CV consumers do not confront versions of CVM where the (hypothetical) payments are explicitly allowed
to differ. It is due to the existence of these problems that my comments
above referred only to open-ended versions of the CVM.
Postscript 2
A brief sketch of an example of a non-hypothetical field experiment of the type indicated at the end of the paper is given here. It
concerns a study (by Per Olov Johansson, Bengt Kristr6m and the present author) of the valuation of wetland conservation in Sweden. This
study is now underway, pending financial support from the Swedish
EPA.
The Swedish government has made a list of wetland areas for
protection and identified which ones it can fund for protection and
10. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Natural Resource Damage
Assessments under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Reg. 4601 (Jan. 15, 1993).
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which ones it cannot, at least not for the next five years. One suitable
area in the second group is chosen for the study. The main points of
the study design are as follows:
(1)
The area in question can be rented for protection during a period of five years (during which the government has declared it definitely cannot fund this project). The rental is SEK A.
(2)
The government (the Swedish EPA) decides more or less arbitrarily that it values protection of this area during the next five years
at SEK B (B < A), on behalf of the present and future Swedish population, excluding the present population in a set of counties in the neighborhood of area. (This amount of SEK B would be financed separately by
the Swedish EPA, if the results of the study indicate that the conservation contract shall be purchased.)
(3)
The local population (N) is asked, in a "referendum-like manner" as explained below, about their WTP for conserving this area during the five-year period. If stated average WTP is found to exceed
average project costs ((A - B)/N), see further below), the conservation
contract will be purchased and 80 percent of the contract cost will be
paid by the local population.
(4)
Why "80 percent"? The primary purpose of the study is to compare a CVM estimate with an estimate according to the interval method.
(I) Ten percent of the population (at least 100 subjects) will be asked
an ordinary open-ended CVM question. (II) Another ten percent will
be asked to state their WTP, again without having to pay anything but
now being told that their responses provide part of the information on
which the government bases its decision whether the contracts should
be purchased or not. This group is confronted with an incentive (if any)
to overstate their WTP. (III) 80 percent of the population will be asked
to state their WTP and, if the outcome is that the area should be preserved, they would have to pay the percentage of the WTP stated that
would cover their share (80 percent) of project costs. If so, the remaining 20 percent of project costs would be covered by the WTP test budget.
(5)
The "voters", groups II and III, will be informed essentially as
follows: (i) since it is difficult to elicit true WTP statements from people in a simple and direct fashion, due to misrepresentation incentives,
different voters will have to be subjected to different payment consequences, some of which may lead to overstatements and others to understatements of WTP; (ii) given the group to which the individual
(household) belongs, information will be provided as to what incentives are relevant here (group III, see point (6) below); (iii) if it is found
that aggregate WTP exceeds project costs, subjects in group III will have
to pay, as stated in their respective instructions (see point (7) below);
(iv) the information problem stated in point (i) implies that voters (and
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so they are told) are confronted with different, and therefore "unfair",
payment consequences; specifically, a minority of 20 percent is given
a free ride; a minor consolation for the majority is that the "lucky ones"
will be selected at random (in a process that is open to public supervision).
(6)
The incentive provided to group III is to understate WTP and
this group is so informed. Some observers in the literature have argued that incentives are unclear, when the subject is committed to pay
"only" a share (100 percent or less) of stated WTP. This position must
be interpreted as saying that there would be an incentive for some to
overstate WTP in the state of the world where they need to pay less
than 100 percent of their stated WTP. However, if such a state materializes, it would mean that revealed aggregate WTP is higher than project costs, and hence, that the project will be carried out. If so, there
"cannot" be any rational reason for overstating one's WTP, since the
only reason for this would be to increase the chances of having the project accepted. Therefore, it is flatly stated to this group that there is an
incentive (if any) to understate preferences in, so to speak, all possible states of the world.
(7)
The project will definitely be carried out if average WTP in group
III exceeds average project costs (AC). It may be carried out even if
this lower bound to true average WTP is below AC, a necessary condition being that the upper bound provided by group II is above AC.
This decision is up to the government (the Swedish EPA). If, in this latter case, the government decides to have the project carried out, it will
be at an extra cost to the government, since the commitment by group
III no longer covers 80 percent of costs.

